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This paper uses novel data on the performance of loan pools underlying asset backed
securities to estimate a competing risks model of default and prepayment on subprime
automobile loans. We nd that prepayment rates increase rapidly with loan age but are
not aected by prevailing market interest rates. Default rates are much more sensitive
to aggregate shocks than are prepayment rates. Increases in unemployment precede
increases in default rates, suggesting that defaults on subprime automobile loans are
driven largely by shocks to household liquidity. There are signicant dierences in the
default and prepayment rates faced by dierent subprime lenders. Those lenders that
charge the highest interest rates experience the highest default rates, but also experience
somewhat lower prepayment rates. We conjecture that there is substantial heterogeneity
among subprime borrowers, and that dierent lenders target dierent segments of the
subprime market. Because of their higher default rates, loans that carry the highest
interest rates do not appear to yield the highest expected returns.1 Introduction
While lending to all types of households increased substantially during the 1990s, lending
to households with limited nancial resources and/or short or impaired credit histories
{ so-called subprime borrowers { has drawn particular attention from policy makers and
bank regulators. Anecdotal evidence that subprime lenders have encouraged borrow-
ers to renance loans on unfavorable terms or have embedded obscure but expensive
covenants in loan contracts have led to accusations that subprime lenders engage in
\predatory" lending practices. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, as
well as legislation adopted by some state and municipal governments, has sought to
redress these concerns by imposing additional reporting requirements and limiting spe-
cic pricing policies and covenants on high-cost residential mortgages (Elliehausen and
Staten 2002).
Even when loans are priced fairly, subprime borrowers, who by and large have lower
and more volatile income and fewer assets than prime borrowers, may have particular
diculty making regular debt payments during times of economic stress. Bank regulators
tasked with ensuring the safety and soundness of the US banking system have focused
on the potential costs to banks and thrifts of large numbers of subprime loan defaults.
In January 2001, after several federally insured nancial institutions experienced severe
losses on subprime loan portfolios, the Federal Reserve, the Oce of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Oce of Thrift
Supervision jointly issued guidelines requiring stricter supervision of banks and thrifts
engaged in subprime lending.
The need for greater regulation of subprime lenders is obviously closely linked to the
question of whether the interest rates and fees charged on subprime loans are sucient to
adequately compensate nancial institutions for the risks of lending to less credit-worthy
borrowers. Yet although some lenders have developed proprietary models to underwrite
subprime loans, very little academic research has examined the risks associated with
subprime lending. In a unique study, Malmquist, Phillips-Patrick and Rossi (1997) use
balance sheet data to examine the performance of savings and loan institutions that
do substantial mortgage lending in low-income neighborhoods. They nd that these
S&Ls have higher costs including credit losses, but comparable prot rates, to S&Ls
that do not lend in low-income neighborhoods. Balance sheet data do not permit a
direct analysis of the causes of credit losses on S&L mortgage portfolios. A great deal
of empirical research including recent work by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000),
1Pavlov (2001), and Calhoun and Deng (2002) has used loan-level data to investigate the
economic drivers of default and prepayment risks on residential mortgages, but none has
explicitly examined the risks associated with subprime lending.
This paper seeks to broaden our understanding of subprime credit markets by exam-
ining the sources of default and prepayment risks on subprime automobile loans. In many
ways, automobile loans are similar to xed rate residential mortgages. Both are held by
households and are collateralized by tangible assets. Both are repaid using xed-coupon
amortization schedules, and both contain embedded default and prepayment options.
Thus, one can expect insights into the behavior of borrowers and lenders in subprime
automobile loan markets to shed light on the relationship between loan pricing and loan
risk on subprime mortgages. An important advantage of studying automobile loans is
that available data permit one to compare loan pricing and credit risk across a number
of dierent lenders.
An improved understanding of the risks inherent in subprime automobile lending
is also of value independent of what it tells us about other types of subprime lending,
because automobile loans represent a signicant portion of consumer debt. At the end
of 1998, the last year for which gures are available, debt outstanding on all automobile
loans was $447 billion, and accounted for 61 percent of non-revolving, non-mortgage
consumer debt and 34 percent of all non-mortgage consumer debt. Although denitive
data on the size of the growing subprime automobile loan market are not available,
at the end of 2001, principal outstanding on loans in pools securitized by companies
specializing in subprime automobile lending stood at $30 billion.
The primary impediment to empirical research on automobile lending is lack of data.
Indeed, we are not aware of any publicly available disaggregated data on the performance
of individual subprime automobile loans. However, as the loan backed securities market
has developed, new data on the performance on pools of automobile loans have become
available. Since the mid-1990s a number of nance companies have employed asset-
backed securities to fund a large share of their automobile lending. Moody's produces
regular reports that combine information from SEC lings on securitization deals with
information obtained directly from ABS issuers. Using these data, we have constructed
a sample of 3,595 month-pool observations tracking the performance of 124 pools of
automobile loans issued by 13 nance companies specializing in subprime lending.
The Moody's data do not track individual loans, but rather provide pool-level ac-
counting information that can be used to infer the total numbers of loans that default
2and prepay during each month that a pool is active. Because of the aggregated nature
of these data, standard loan-level competing risks models commonly used to investigate
mortgage termination risks cannot be estimated directly. However, we show that if one
assumes that all loans within a pool share the same hazard function, then a competing
risks model can be estimated from pool-level data. This modeling approach enables us
to investigate the eects of loan seasoning, aggregate shocks, and dierences across loan
issuers on subprime automobile loan default and prepayment rates.
We nd that prepayment rates are high and increase rapidly with loan age, but are
not aected by market interest rates. Subprime borrowers do not appear to renance
their loans in response to relatively small declines in prevailing interest rates. Instead
they appear more likely to prepay their loans out of earned income, by renancing to
lower rate prime loans as their credit histories improve, or by selling their cars.
The hazard function for loan defaults is relatively ﬂat. Unlike residential mortgage
default hazard functions, it does not decline signicantly toward the end of a loan's life,
perhaps because automobiles do not hold their values as well as real estate. Increases in
unemployment rates precede increases in default rates, indicating that default rates on
subprime automobile loans are particularly sensitive to shocks to household liquidity.
Our analysis reveals signicant dierences in the default and prepayment rates faced
by dierent subprime lenders. Those issuers that charge the highest interest rates expe-
rience the highest default rates, but also experience somewhat lower prepayment rates.
This suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity among subprime borrowers, and
that dierent issuers target dierent segments of the subprime market. Loans that carry
the highest interest rates do not appear pay the highest returns net of default losses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Moody's loan-backed securities
reports and explains how we extract aggregate pool performance information from the
accounting data they provide. Section 3 presents a simple competing risks model of
default and prepayment and shows how it can be estimated from aggregated pool-level
data. An analysis of the eects of loan seasoning, aggregate shocks, and loan issuers
on default and prepayment rates is presented in Section 4. Section 5 examines the
relationship between loan interest rates and default and prepayment rates. Section 6
draws conclusions and discusses opportunities for future research.
32D a t a
There exists no widely-accepted denition of a subprime borrower. In a March 3, 1999
guidance letter to bank supervisors, the major US bank regulators (the Oce of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Reserve Board, and the Oce of Thrift Supervision) dene subprime lending as \ex-
tending credit to borrowers who exhibit characteristics indicating a signicantly higher
risk of default than traditional bank lending customers." In a January 31, 2001 guidance
letter the regulators go further by proposing the following working denition of subprime
borrowers:
Generally, subprime borrowers will display a range of credit risk character-
istics that may include one or more of the following:
 Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more
60-day delinquencies in the past 24 months;
 Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-o in the prior 24 months;
 Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;
 Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a
credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on prod-
uct/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent
default probability likelihood; and/or
 Debt service-to-income ratio of 50% or greater, or otherwise limited
ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly
debt-service requirements from monthly income.
However, the guidance letter emphasizes that this denition is \illustrative rather than
exhaustive." Asset based loans with relatively poor collateral may also be classied as
subprime. For example, some mortgage lenders view very high loan-to-value residential
mortgages as subprime, and some automobile nance companies treat used car loans as
subprime.
This study makes use of data on loans issued by automobile nance companies that
Moody's has identied as specializing in subprime lending. To establish this classi-
cation Moody's relies on the representations of the companies themselves, as well as
information on the characteristics of those companies' typical borrowers. The nance
companies identied by Moody's are not the only providers of subprime automobile
loans to consumers. Banks, thrifts, and nance companies that principally target prime
4borrowers have also become involved in subprime lending in recent years. Lending from
these institutions is not represented in our data.
Finance companies originate subprime automobile loans using a network of franchises
and car dealers. They may fund this lending with traditional debt or equity, but in the
1990s many of these companies also began to issue asset-backed securities. In a typical
automobile securitization, an originator pools several thousand automobile loans and
sells these to a special-purpose entity such as a trust. The special-purpose entity, in
turn, issues securities backed by a benecial interest in the receivables from the loans in
the pool. Typically, the originator continues to service the loans for a fee. Depending on
credit enhancements, asset quality, servicer strength, and other variables, these securities
are assigned a credit rating and can be traded in capital markets.
It is possible that the automobile loans that underly asset-backed securities are not
representative of all loans made by nance companies. For example, some lenders may
choose to \cherry pick" by securitizing only their relatively less desirable loans. We
believe this potential source of selection bias is of limited practical importance because
several of the largest nance companies represented in our sample have adopted explicit
policies of securitizing all or nearly all of the loans they originate. Unfortunately, data
comparing the characteristics of on- and o-balance sheet automobile loan portfolios are
not publicly available.
Each issuer of publicly-traded automobile loan-backed securities submits periodic
reports to the SEC documenting the performance of the underlying collateral pool.
Using these data and other sources, Moody's publishes New Issue Reports describing
each collateral pool and Pool Performance Reports that track the performance of pools
over time. Among the variables included in a typical New Issue Report are the initial
weighted average interest rate (termed weighted average coupon, or WAC), the weighted
average maturity, and the age of loans in a pool, as well as the initial number of loans
and asset balance for the pool. Variables available on a monthly frequency from Pool
Performance Reports include the principal balance on loans outstanding, delinquency
rates, dollars charged-o, and dollars prepaid for active pools.
We have compiled sucient data from Moody's New Issue and Pool Performance
reports to construct a sample of 3,595 pool-month observations on 124 loan pools from
13 dierent issuers. A total of 3.3 million automobile loans were held in these pools.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample of loan pools. Figure 1 provides
information on pool issue dates, pool sizes, and WACs. Although some of the pools in
5our sample were issued during 1994, 1995, and 1996, performance data for most pools
are only available after 1996.
The fundamental unit of analysis for examining default and prepayment risk is the
individual loan. The aggregate competing risks model described in Section 3 requires
information on the number of loans that default and prepay in each month in the life of a
pool. Because these data are not directly reported by Moody's, we must infer them from
available accounting data. To accomplish this, we rst calculate the average remaining
balance for active loans in a pool by using information on the pool's average loan size,
weighted average coupon, and maturity in a standard amortization formula. We then
estimate the number of prepaid loans by dividing the reported dollars of principal prepaid
in a month by the estimated average remaining loan principal balance for that month.
Estimating the number of loans that default in a month requires that we make an as-
sumption about the relationship between charge-os and loan defaults. We assume that
when a loan defaults, sixty percent of its remaining principal is charged o. The number
of loans that default is estimated by dividing the reported dollars charged o in a month
by the estimated principal balance scaled to reﬂect the charge-o assumption. The sixty
percent charge-o rule represents what we take to be a reasonable approximation of
standard practice based on discussions with industry participants. Unfortunately, the
detailed accounting data needed to either validate or generalize this simple rule are not
publicly available. To the extent that our sixty percent charge-o assumption is too high
(respectively, too low) we will under (over) predict default probabilities. Nonetheless,
our conclusions about the economic drivers of default and prepayment risk should be
robust to reasonable departures from this assumption.1
3 The Competing Risks Model
Several recent studies including Deng et al. (2000), Pavlov (2001), Ambrose and Sanders
(2001), and Calhoun and Deng (2002) have used a competing risks framework to model
loan default and prepayment. Unlike these studies, we observe information on the ag-
gregate performance of loan pools rather than on individual loans. In this section, we
1The high charge-o rate is largely a result of the the costs associated with repossessing and selling
used cars. A large and reportedly better managed company in our sample reports charge-o rates on
repossessed cars on the order of fty percent. Industry analysts have suggested larger numbers for other
nance companies. As a robustness check, we have estimated our model using a number of dierent
xed charge-o assumptions. Though higher charge-o assumptions result in lower overall predicted
default rates, the qualitative features of our model are unaected.
6show how a standard competing risks framework can be modied to model aggregate
pool performance data. Our approach makes use of the discrete outcome interpretation
of duration models described by Allison (1982) in a general setting and by Shumway
(2001) in an application to credit risk modeling.
Consider a pool of N0 loans with a maturity of T months. At the end of month t,
an active loan must arrive in one of three states; it must remain active, default, or be
paid o. A loan that has neither defaulted nor been paid o by the end of month t − 1
is said to have survived to month t. If a loan does not survive it drops out of the pool,
so the number and composition of loans remaining in a loan pool changes from month
to month.
Let Sit be an indicator variable that is equal to one if loan i has survived to month
t and zero otherwise. Let yit be a discrete variable that is equal to one if loan i defaults
in month t, two if it is prepaid in month t, and zero otherwise. We assume that,
conditional on observable time-varying, pool-level variables, transitions to default or
prepayment are independent across loans and follow a non-homogeneous Markov process.
The hazard rate for default (respectively, prepayment) is the probability that a loan
defaults (prepays) in month t given that it has survived to the end of month t − 1. We
model these hazard rates using a simple multinomial logit specication of the form
h
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are index functions of model parameters and exogenous variables that vary across pools
and time, but not across obligors within a pool. Using a result from Lancaster (1990,
page 12), it can be shown that the probability that loan i survives to the end of month
t is
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In the language of duration models, Ht is called a survival function. If the time paths of
1
t and 2
t are known, then (1) and (2) can be used to calculate cumulative and monthly
survival, default, and prepayment probabilities.
We cannot observe yit because we do not have loan-specic performance data. How-
ever, by using the methods described in Section 2, we can infer the number of loans that
7default and prepay during each month in the life of a loan pool. Let Nt be the number of
loans in a pool that are active at the end of month t,a n dl e tn1
t and n2
t be the numbers
of loans that default and prepay in month t. By denition Nt = Nt−1 −n1
t −n2
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be the vector of observed active loan counts from months one to t,a n dl e tn1
t and n2
t be
the corresponding vectors for default and prepayment counts.
Since all loans in a pool share the same hazard rates, the number of loans that
survive, default, and prepay in month t conditional on the number of loans active at the



















































so we can write the likelihood function for the history of observed defaults and prepay-





















Given data on defaults and prepayments for a number of pools, the parameters of the
index functions 1
t and 2
t can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
The hazard rate index functions depend on a pool's age, calendar time, and the pool's




















where dq is an indicator variable identifying calendar quarter q,a n dIk is an indicator
variable identifying pool issuer k. Greek letters denote model parameters. Note that
because we include a full set of quarter dummies, one issuer dummy must be dropped.
The probabilities of default and prepayment for older loans are likely to be dierent
from those associated with more recent loans because borrowers' nancial circumstances
tend to evolve over time. For example, renancing opportunities may increase with loan
age as a borrower demonstrates an ability to manage credit eectively. Changes in the
8relationship between the value of collateral backing a loan and the value of the loan
itself may also aect a borrower's incentive to prepay or renance. The fourth-order
polynomials of t in 1 and 2 permit a broad range of patterns of smooth changes in
default and prepayment hazard rates.
Permitting pool default probabilities to depend on calendar time allows us to cap-
ture the eects of systematic shocks that aect loans in all pools. Rather than explicitly
including a list of macroeconomic variables in the index function, we use vectors of quar-
ter xed eects. This allows us to remain agnostic about the determinants of aggregate
shocks that are likely to aect default and prepayment rates, and ensures that omitted
macroeconomic variables will not induce biases in our estimates of seasoning and issuer
eects.
Including pool issuer xed eects in the specications of 1 and 2 allows for the
possibility that loans originated by some issuers have higher default or prepayment
hazard rates than others. Such dierences could be important if, for example, dierent
issuers specialize in lending to dierent segments of the subprime market.
4 Results
Our empirical specication isolates the eects of loan age (seasoning), calendar time,
and loan issuer on default and prepayment probabilities. In this section we examine
each of these eects in turn.
4.1 Loan Seasoning
Figure 2 plots estimated hazard functions for loan default and prepayment holding time
and issuer eects constant at their sample means. Parameter estimates for the fourth-
order polynomials in loan age that generate these curves are reported in Table 2.
The default hazard function rises for the rst year and levels o or increases only
slightly thereafter. The tendency for default hazard rates to increase during the early
months in the life of a loan has been well documented in previous research on residential
and commercial mortgages. It seems reasonable to expect that loan ocers and auto-
mated credit scoring models are more eective in identifying and screening out obligors
who are likely to default over the near term than over the medium or long term. As nan-
cial conditions change over time, the ability of some obligors to make regular payments
will naturally deteriorate, causing default hazards to rise.
9Prior research on residential mortgages has found that after reaching a peak, default
hazard rates tend to fall (Deng et al. 2000, Calhoun and Deng 2002). A common
explanation for this empirical regularity focuses on the relationship between the value of
a mortgage and the value of its underlying collateral. As a mortgage ages, the value of
the loan declines while the value of the real estate collateralizing the loan tends to grow.
Defaults rates decline as falling loan-to-value ratios increase the relative cost of default
to borrowers. We nd little evidence of declining hazard rates late in the life of subprime
automobile loans. Unlike real estate, the value of an automobile tends to decline over
time. Thus loan-to-value ratios for automobile loans may not fall very rapidly, and may
well increase over some portion of the life of a loan.
As can be seen in Figure 2, prepayment hazard rates are much higher than default
hazard rates and rise quickly with loan age. There are several possible explanations for
the increasing duration dependence of loan prepayments. As a loan ages and its principal
is paid down, it becomes easier for an obligor to prepay the remaining principal out of
earned income. Moreover, an obligor's ability to renance the loan at more favorable
terms may increase as he or she builds a stronger credit history. Finally, many obligors
undoubtedly choose to prepay when selling their cars. An obligor is presumably less
likely to sell a car in the early months of a loan shortly after the car was purchased.
4.2 Aggregate Shocks
Default and prepayment probabilities for all subprime automobile loans can be expected
to rise and fall as macroeconomic conditions change. Our competing risks model captures
these aggregate eects by allowing for quarter-specic shocks that aect the default and
prepayment probabilities of all currently active loans. Figure 3 shows predicted default
and prepayment hazard rates for a six-month-old loan holding issuer eects constant at
the sample average. Estimated parameter values are reported in Table 3.
Because they aect all obligors, aggregate shocks to prepayment and default prob-
abilities pose risks that are more dicult for lenders to manage than shocks that are
idiosyncratic to individual obligors. Idiosyncratic risk can be easily diversied away,
while systematic risk must be hedged. To evaluate the relative importance of system-
atic shocks in determining default and prepayment rates, we calculated the interquartile
range of each time series of quarter xed eects and divided by the median xed eect.
This volatility measure is similar to the more common volatility statistic calculated by
dividing a time series' standard deviation by its mean, but is more robust to measure-
10ment errors in the estimated xed eects. Our volatility measure is 0.065 for the default
xed eects and 0.026 for the prepayment xed eects, indicating that aggregate shocks
play a much larger role in determining loan defaults than loan prepayments.
To examine the eects of macroeconomic conditions on default and prepayment prob-
abilities, the estimated quarter xed eects were regressed on an array of aggregate vari-
ables. Explanatory variables are described in Table 4, and results are reported in Tables
5a n d6 . 2 The one-quarter lagged civilian unemployment rate, the one-quarter lagged
aggregate household debt-service burden, and the number of personal bankruptcy cases
led were included to account for aggregate changes in households' ability to repay or
prepay their loans.3 One-year treasury rates were included to examine the possibility
that falling interest rates might make renancing more desirable.4
Regressions (a) and (b) in Table 5 most accurately reﬂect our ex ante beliefs about the
factors that drive aggregate changes in default rates. Increases in the unemployment
rate unambiguously lead aggregate changes in default rates. These eects are both
statistically and economically signicant. The point elasticity of the default hazard
rate with respect to the unemployment rate evaluated at the sample mean is 1.94 in
regression (a) and 2.24 in regression (b). Both the household debt-service burden and
total bankruptcies were trending upward throughout the time period of our data, so we
cannot meaningfully distinguish between the eects of these two variables. Neither is
statistically signicant, though both have the expected sign. We nd no evidence that
current treasury rates aect default hazards.
A large body of empirical research has found a strong negative correlation between
prevailing interest rates and residential mortgage prepayment rates. As can be seen from
columns (c), (d), and (e) in Table 6, we nd little evidence that auto loan prepayment
rates increase as prevailing interest rates fall. This may be because there are fewer
direct renancing opportunities available to subprime auto loan borrowers, or because
2In each regression, a feasible generalized least squares procedure was used to correct for het-
eroscedasticity arising from dierences in the precision with which each of the quarter xed eects
were estimated.
3Except in the case of bankruptcy, loans are not generally written o until they are at least 120
days past due. Thus we expect the unemployment rate and the household debt-service burden to lead
defaults by at least a quarter. Other specications were run in which real variables were either not
lagged or were lagged two or more quarters. These regressions produced similar though weaker results.
Because the data span only 24 quarters, a more detailed analysis of the timing of real variables and
default and prepayment rates was not possible.
4Three, ve, and ten-year treasury rates were also examined, but they had no greater explanatory
power than the one-year rate.
11the benets associated with auto loan renancing are much smaller than those associated
with mortgage renancing.
Other macroeconomic variables may aect prepayment rates if, for example, nan-
cially stressed households nd it more dicult to prepay their high rate loans. The
household debt-service burden and the number of personal bankruptcy cases are not
statistically signicant, but do have the expected sign. Unexpectedly, the unemploy-
ment rate appears to be positively correlated with prepayments. The elasticity of the
prepayment hazard rate with respect to the unemployment rate ranges from 0.46 un-
der regression (b) to 0.52 under regression (d). These gures are much lower than the
corresponding default hazard elasticities.
4.3 Dierences Among Subprime Lenders
Issuer-specic xed eects in our competing risks model allow for the possibility that
dierent subprime lenders experience systematically dierent default and prepayment
rates. These xed eects are reported in Table 7. Similar information is displayed in
Panel (a) of Figure 4, which plots the default and prepayment hazard rates for a six-
month-old loan for each issuer holding time eects constant. The correlation between
default and prepayment issuer xed eects is -0.33, indicating that those lenders that
experience higher default rates also tend to experience lower prepayment rates.
Dierences in prepayment and default rates across issuers can arise whether or not
there is signicant heterogeneity among subprime borrowers. If all subprime borrowers
were homogeneous, then dierences in observed default and prepayment rates could arise
from dierences in underwriting or collections policies across issuers. If, as seems more
likely, there is substantial heterogeneity among subprime borrowers, then dierences
across issuers could also arise if dierent issuers choose to lend to dierent types of
borrowers.
The negative relationship between default and prepayment rates that we observe is
consistent with the view that (1) borrowers who are most able to prepay their loans
are least likely to default, and (2) dierent subprime lenders target dierent segments
of the subprime market. As will be shown in the next section, further support for this
conjecture can be found by examining the relationship between loan interest rates and
default and prepayment rates.
125 The Pricing of Subprime Automobile Loans
The weighted average coupon (WAC) for a pool measures the annualized average interest
rate charged on loans in that pool at origination. This is an eective measure of the
interest rate charged on active loans throughout the life of a pool because nearly all
subprime automobile loans carry xed rates. A regression of pool weighted average
coupon on a vector of dummy variables identifying each of the 13 issuers in our sample
reveals that issuer identity alone explains 96.5 percent of the cross-pool variation in
interest rates. When quarter dummies are added the explanatory power of the regression
rises only slightly to 97.7 percent, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the quarter
xed eects are jointly equal to zero. Thus, our data provide strong evidence that the
interest rate charged on a subprime automobile loan is much more closely linked to the
nance company making the loan than to prevailing economic conditions at the time the
loan was made. In light of the strong link between issuer and weighted average coupon,
the analysis that follows treats the issuer as the unit of analysis for examining the
relationship between interest rates charged and default and prepayment probabilities.
There are several reasons to believe that loan interest rates are related to prepayment
and default probabilities. From a lender's perspective, the most protable subprime
customers are those that neither default nor prepay. To the extent that either form
of premature loan termination can be predicted by lenders, dierences in risks should
be priced into the interest rate charged to borrowers. Causality can also work in the
opposite direction. As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, higher risk borrowers have
fewer available nancing opportunities so those borrowers who are likely to accept higher
interest rate loans can be expected to have higher default rates than those who accept
lower rate loans. Finally, interest rates may directly aect borrower behavior. Borrowers
faced with the high monthly payments associated with high interest rate loans may have
more diculty making regular loan payments. Furthermore, borrowers with the means
have a stronger incentive to rapidly prepay higher rate loans. Given the limitations of
available data, we cannot distinguish among these dierent causal links between interest
rates and default and prepayment risks. We can, however, assess the extent to which
the interest rates charged by dierent lenders are correlated with these risks.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 4 plot the predicted one-month default and prepayment
hazard rates for a six-month-old loan for each issuer against the average WAC of that
issuer's loans. Panel (c) shows a strong positive relationship between default probabili-
ties and interest rates, while Panel (b) shows a somewhat weaker negative relationship
13between prepayment probabilities and interest rates. The correlation between an issuer's
average WAC and its default xed eect is 0.92. The correlation between an issuer's
average WAC and its prepayment xed eect is -0.26. The negative correlation between
interest rates and prepayment rates is somewhat surprising, since borrowers paying the
highest interest rates have the strongest incentives to prepay their loans. However, it
is consistent with the market segmentation hypothesis outlined in Section 4.3. If dif-
ferent subprime lenders focus on dierent segments of the subprime market, then one
would expect those lenders that specialize in serving the riskiest customers to charge the
highest interest rates. Furthermore, if high risk borrowers are the least able to prepay
their loans, then we should observe a negative correlation between prepayment rates and
interest rates.
Given the observed positive correlation between interest rates and default rates, it is
natural to ask whether the high interest rates charged on subprime loans are sucient
to compensate lenders for the high default probabilities associated with these loans. We
examine this question by comparing the interest rates charged by each issuer with the
internal rate of return (IRR) of that issuer's loans.
The IRR is the annualized discount rate required to set the net present value of an
expected stream of cash ﬂows equal to the value of the original investment. In the context
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Pt is the share of original principal outstanding in month t, M is the monthly loan
payment as a proportion of original principal, and  is the recovery rate on a defaulted
loan.5 Given the weighted average coupon and the weighted average maturity of a loan
pool, Pt and M are calculated using a standard amortization formula. It is important
to emphasize that these IRR gures do not directly reﬂect the costs associated with
originating or servicing loans, nor do they reﬂect the opportunity cost of capital. Taken
by themselves, they cannot tell us which lenders made the most protable loans. They
can, however, provide an indication of whether loan interest rates fully reﬂect cross-issuer
dierences in default rates.
5As discussed in Section 2, we assume  =0 :4. Changing this assumption does not substantively
aect estimated IRRs. Higher recovery assumptions imply higher predicted default rates. These two
eects tend to cancel out one another in the IRR calculation.
14The dashed line in Figure 5 shows the theoretical relationship between WAC and IRR
in the absence of loan defaults and prepayments. Default losses reduce a loan's internal
rate of return, so expected IRRs will always lie below this line. The solid line shows the
average three-year Treasury rate during the sample period. The crosses plot the average
internal rate of return for loans from each issuer (holding time eects constant) against
the average interest rate charged by that issuer.
The average estimated IRR taken across all loans in the sample is 9.6 percent, which
is much lower than the 16.0 percent average interest rate charged on these loans but is
signicantly higher than the 5.3 percent yield paid on a comparable-maturity Treasury
bond during the sample period. According to the Federal Reserve's G-19 statistical
release, the average interest rate charged at origination on 48-month new car loans issued
by commercial banks between 1996 and 2001 was 8.8 percent. Since this gure does not
net out default losses, it is an upper bound on the expected yield for prime loans. Thus,
it would appear that subprime loans provided, on average, a higher expected yield than
prime rate automobile loans during the sample period.
The expected IRR is an estimate of a loan's yield after adjusting for expected losses
due to default and prepayment. This return measure does not make adjustments for
the greater variability in losses on loans made to higher risk borrowers. Therefore, the
presence of a risk-premium for more volatile income streams would imply a positive
relationship between loan interest rates and IRR. In contrast, the correlation between
issuer average WAC and issuer average IRR is -0.52, indicating that higher loan interest
rates tend to be more than oset by higher default rates. This suggests that risk-based
pricing alone cannot explain cross-issuer dierences in interest rates.
6 Conclusion
In many ways subprime automobile loans are similar to xed-rate residential mortgages.
Both are secured by assets, both are repaid on xed-coupon amortization schedules,
and both carry xed interest rates. Nonetheless, our analysis reveals some important
dierences between the economic factors that aect defaults and prepayments on these
two types of loans.
Research on residential mortgages consistently nds a strong negative relationship
between prevailing market interest rates and prepayment rates, suggesting that mortgage
holders strategically exercise prepayment options. We nd no evidence that market
15interest rates are related to prepayment rates on subprime automobile loans, but we
do nd that prepayment hazard rates increase rapidly with loan age. Thus, subprime
borrowers do not appear to renance their automobile loans when prevailing interest
rates fall, but do exhibit a strong tendency to prepay loans out of earned income, by
shifting to lower prime-rate loans as their credit histories improve, or by selling their
cars.
Loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) play an important role in explaining default rates on
residential mortgages. As a mortgage ages and its principal is paid down, its LTV falls
and default becomes less likely. We nd little evidence of falling default hazard rates late
in the lives of subprime automobile loans. Unlike real estate, the value of an automobile
tends to decline over time, so a loan's LTV may not fall very rapidly, and may well
increase during some portion of the loan's life. We nd a strong positive relationship
between default rates and unemployment rates, suggesting that defaults on subprime
automobile loans are particularly sensitive to shocks to household liquidity.
Disaggregated data would permit a more thorough analysis of the eects of loan
seasoning on default and prepayment rates. Although our empirical specication allows
for dierences in borrowers across pools, it does not explicitly model within-pool obligor
heterogeneity. Because of this, it is possible that the hazard functions we estimate reﬂect
not only the eects of a loan's age, but also the eects of changes in the composition of
active loans in a pool. For example, the default rate for a pool may increase with its age
because the lowest-risk obligors in that pool tend to prepay their loan early and drop
out. Han and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992), and Deng et al. (2000) have proposed
methods for modeling unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risks framework, but
these approaches are not directly applicable to aggregated data. In the absence of
detailed loan-specic information, strong assumptions about the shape of default and
prepayment hazard functions and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity within
pools would be needed to separate the eects of loan seasoning from changes in pool
composition.
An important advantage of the Moody's pool performance data used in this study
is that they permit comparisons of loan pricing and credit risk across subprime lenders.
Our analysis reveals a strong positive correlation between the interest rates an issuer
charges and the average default rates of its borrowers, and a somewhat weaker negative
correlation between those interest rates and prepayment rates. These empirical regu-
larities suggest that those borrowers who are most likely to default are least likely to
16prepay, and that dierent issuers focus on dierent segments of the subprime market.
Loans carrying the highest interest rates do not appear to yield the highest expected
returns, suggesting that risk-based pricing alone cannot explain observed cross-issuer
dierences in interest rates. Without information on the credit-worthiness of individual
borrowers it is impossible to determine whether dierences in interest rates are a cause
or an eect of dierences in default and prepayment rates. Disaggregated data that
include information on the performance of individual loans as well as the characteristics
of individual borrowers would go a long way toward improving our understanding of the
link between interest rates and automobile loan default and prepayment rates.
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19Mean Std. Dev.
Pool Asset Value ($millions) 403.3 320.6
Number of Loans in Pool 26,409 20,412
Average Loan Principal ($) 15,158 4,280
Weighted Average Coupon (annual) 0.167 0.027
Average Loan Maturity (months) 60.1 6.3
Table 1: Sample statistics for subprime auto loan pools.
Default Prepayment
Parameter Std. Err. Parameter Std. Err.
AGE 2.930E-1 3.814E-2 5.052E-2 1.072E-3
AGE2 -1.619E-2 2.895E-4 -1.869E-3 1.160E-4
AGE3 3.729E-4 8.592E-6 3.626E-5 4.811E-6
AGE4 -3.010E-6 8.650E-8 -1.961E-7 4.840E-8
Table 2: Loan seasoning curve parameter estimates (s).
20Default Prepayment
Coecient Std. Err. Coecient Std. Err.
96Q1 -6.4039 0.1926 -4.5357 0.0765
96Q2 -5.5352 0.1084 -4.4674 0.0689
96Q3 -5.1769 0.0656 -4.4941 0.0603
96Q4 -4.7618 0.0551 -4.6340 0.0588
97Q1 -5.2278 0.0534 -4.6011 0.0583
97Q2 -5.2558 0.0524 -4.6078 0.0580
97Q3 -5.2833 0.0519 -4.6536 0.0579
97Q4 -5.2816 0.0516 -4.7824 0.0578
98Q1 -5.3056 0.0515 -4.7799 0.0578
98Q2 -5.4041 0.0514 -4.6884 0.0577
98Q3 -5.4023 0.0513 -4.7275 0.0577
98Q4 -5.4149 0.0513 -4.7594 0.0576
99Q1 -5.6324 0.0513 -4.7013 0.0576
99Q2 -5.7690 0.0514 -4.5560 0.0575
99Q3 -5.7576 0.0513 -4.5956 0.0575
99Q4 -5.5212 0.0511 -4.7038 0.0575
00Q1 -5.6404 0.0510 -4.6983 0.0575
00Q2 -5.7263 0.0511 -4.6411 0.0575
00Q3 -5.6878 0.0510 -4.7204 0.0575
00Q4 -5.5729 0.0510 -4.8622 0.0575
01Q1 -5.6091 0.0509 -4.8150 0.0575
01Q2 -5.6388 0.0509 -4.6941 0.0575
01Q3 -5.4186 0.0506 -4.6615 0.0573
01Q4 -5.2290 0.0505 -4.6991 0.0574
Table 3: Estimated quarter xed eects (s).
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
LUNEMP Lagged unemployment rate 0.04640 0.00528
LDEBTSERV Lagged household debt service burden 0.13566 0.00357
BANKRUPT Personal bankruptcy cases (millions) 0.32597 0.03072
TREAS1YR 1-year treasury rate 0.05126 0.01020
Table 4: Macroeconomic variables used to explain aggregate shocks to default and pre-
payment probabilities.
21(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
CONS −7:57722 −9:54550 −5:33734 −7:30857 −9:16213
(0:61128) (2:02602) (0:22227) (0:93100) (2:77783)
LUNEMP 41:94621 50:48542 {4 1 :10846 49:18430
(8:67296) (9:93544) (8:96561) (11:80575)
LDEBTSERV {1 3 :22131 { { 11:10315
(12:54409) (16:39589)
BANKRUPT 0:65607 { { 0:26273 {
(1:47007) (2:00900)
TREAS1YR {{ −2:55527 −2:01839 −0:71743
(4:31880) (4:76579) (3:53865)
R-Squared 0:640 0:712 0:021 0:619 0:711
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote 90%, 95%, and 99% signicance respectively.
Table 5: Feasible generalized least squares regressions of default hazard quarter xed
eects on macroeconomic variables.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
CONS −4:91618 −4:49211 −4:74635 −4:94250 −4:97000
(0:25587) (1:13757) (0:09005) (0:32756) (1:39643)
LUNEMP 10:44773 9:85022 {1 0 :51240 11:12985
(2:94360) (4:72619) (2:98671) (5:13293)
LDEBTSERV { −4:66778 { { −1:98857
(7:01918) (8:37205)
BANKRUPT −0:73018 { { −0:69414 {
(0:47166) (0:54987)
TREAS1YR {{ 1 :24237 0:22789 1:07874
(1:73858) (1:75606) (1:84786)
R-Squared 0:574 0:468 0:044 0:574 0:486
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote 90%, 95%, and 99% signicance respectively.
Table 6: Feasible generalized least squares regressions of prepayment hazard quarter
xed eects on macroeconomic variables.
22Default Prepayment
Parameter Std. Err. Parameter Std. Err.
Issuer Ay 0{0{
Issuer B -0.9272 0.0489 0.0296 0.0570
Issuer C -0.8243 0.0490 -0.1064 0.0571
Issuer D -0.4523 0.0492 -0.0284 0.0572
Issuer E -1.0286 0.0546 -0.7779 0.0636
Issuer F -0.1640 0.0523 -0.3596 0.0629
Issuer G -1.5218 0.0560 0.2408 0.0587
Issuer H -0.3096 0.0512 -0.0488 0.0594
Issuer I -0.7787 0.0495 -0.1013 0.0574
Issuer J -1.7683 0.0491 0.2119 0.0570
Issuer K -0.5393 0.0507 0.0432 0.0584
Issuer L -1.6985 0.0492 0.0166 0.0571
Issuer M -1.7739 0.0489 0.0860 0.0570
y Issuer A omitted.




























Figure 1: Loan pool issue dates and weighted average coupons. The area of each circle
is proportional to the number of loans in the pool at the issue date.






















Figure 2: Default and prepayment hazard functions, holding time and issuer eects
constant.



















Figure 3: Quarterly one-month default and prepayment hazard rates for a six-month-old
loan, holding issuer eects constant.
























































Figure 4: Default hazard rates, prepayment hazard rates, and Weighted Average Coupon
by issuer. Default and prepayment hazard rates are for six-month-old loans holding time
eects constant.




































Figure 5: Weighted average coupon versus internal rate of return by issuer.
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